Thursday, February 07, 2013

Syllabus | HPJS | Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Civil Judge (Junior Division) Exam | HP PCS (J)

H.P. Judicial Service Competitive Examination | Himachal Pradesh Civil Judge (Junior Division) Examination

Scheme of Examination

It is a three stage examination:-
(A) Preliminary Examination (Objective Type)
(B) Mains Examination (Written Type)
(C) Personality Test (Interview)

(A) Preliminary Examination

The preliminary examination shall be an objective type examination consisting of the following three papers of 100 Marks each:
• Civil Law-I
• Civil Law-II
• Criminal Law
Each paper shall be of one-hour duration and the examination in all the three papers shall be held on the same day. The syllabus for the preliminary examination shall be the same as provided for Paper-I to III for the Main examination.

(B) Main (Narrative) Examination

Main Examination will be consisting of 05 papers as follows:
PAPER-I Civil Law-I (200 Marks)
PAPER-II Civil Law-II (200 Marks)
PAPER-III Criminal Law (200 Marks)
PAPER-IV English Composition (200 Marks)
PAPER-V Language (Hindi) (100 Marks)

Minimum Qualifying Marks:
(i) No candidate shall be credited with any marks in any paper unless he obtains at least 45 percent marks in that paper, except Hindi language paper (paper-V) in which candidate should obtain at least 33 percent marks.
(ii) No candidate shall be considered to have qualified the written test unless he obtains 50 percent marks in aggregate in all papers and at least 33 percent marks in language paper i.e. Hindi in Devanagri script.

Syllabii

Syllabii for main (narrative) examination will be as follows:

Paper-I (Civil Law-I):
  • Code of Civil Procedure
  • Indian Evidence Act
  • Indian Stamp Act
  • Himachal Pradesh Courts Act, 1976
  • Specific Relief Act.
Paper-II. (Civil Law-II):
  • Indian Contract Act
  • Hindu Law
  • Indian Limitation Act
  • Transfer of Property Act
  • H.P. Urban Rent Control Act.
Paper-III. (Criminal Law):
  • Indian Penal Code
  • Criminal Procedure Code
  • Chapter-XVII (section 138 to 143) of the Negotiable Instruments Act
  • H.P. Excise Act- 2011 as Applicable to the State of H.P.
  • Wild Life Protection Act
  • Indian Forest Act.
Paper-IV. (English Composition):
A Choice from three Essays on General Subjects.
  • Essay (150 Marks)
  • Translation of Hindi Passage into English (50 Marks)
(The standard for the English paper shall be that of graduation examination of Himachal Pradesh University.)

Paper-V. (Language):
  • Translation of English passage into Hindi. (30 Marks)
  • Essay in Hindi on any topic out of three. (50 Marks)
  • Composition (Idioms and Corrections etc.). (20 Marks)
(The standard for the language paper shall be that of Matriculation examination of the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education.)

Note: Each paper will last for three hours. Paper I to IV will carry 200 marks each and Paper V 100 marks. 

(C) Viva- Voce (Interview)

Candidates who qualify the Main written examination, will be required to appear at such place, as may be fixed by the Commission, for a viva-voce test. The maximum marks for the viva-voce shall be 100. The marks obtained in the viva-voce will be added to the marks obtained in the Main written examination for purpose of selection of the candidates.

[Updated on 04.03.2014]


Disclaimer: Author has tried his best to provide syllabus that is true and accurate as of the date of writing; however, all the syllabii on the the present blog should be double checked for their accuracy and current applicability. For details click here

Recruitment Notification | H.P. Judicial Service Competitive Exam 2013 | HPPSC

HIMACHAL PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
(ADVERTISEMENT NO. VII /2012)

H.P. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMPETITIVE EXAMINATION-2013

Name of Post: Civil Judge (Junior Division)
Pay Scale:
Rs. 27,700-44,770/-
Number of Posts: Total 08 [Existing number of Vacancies 06 (OBC-02, SC-01, ST-02 & UR-01) & Anticipated Vacancies for the next one Year 02 (UR-02)]

Age Limit:
22 to 30 years (As on the 1st March, 2013)
[RELAXATION IN UPPER AGE LIMIT- The upper age limit is relaxable by 03 years for S.C. / S.T. and other prescribed reserved categories (OPRC) candidates of Himachal Pradesh]
Essential Qualifications: Must be a holder of degree in Law as recognized by the Bar Council of India (As on the 1st March, 2013)

How to Apply:
Visit at http://www.hp.gov.in/hppsc/ and Apply Online.
Last Date:
1/03/2013

Date of Preliminary Examination: 12-05-2013
Date of Main Written Examination: 15th to 18th July, 2013.

For more details, visit the link below-
http://www.hp.gov.in/hppsc/file.axd?file=2013%2f2%2fHJS+Advt-13.pdf

Supreme Court of India | MANOHAR REDDY & ANR. vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.174 OF 2012
M. MANOHAR REDDY & ANR. … PETITIONERS
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam, J.
1. The two petitioners, who are advocates of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, have filed this petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, purportedly in public interest. This writ petition
seeks a writ in the nature of quo warranto, quashing the appointment
of respondent No.3 as a judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
and a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Bar Council of
Andhra Pradesh to cancel his enrolment as an advocate. The
quashing of the appointment of respondent No.3 as a judge of the
High Court is sought on the ground that the consultation process
leading to his appointment was vitiated as both the High Court and
1
the Supreme Court Collegia as well as the Central Government failed
to consider two essential facts; one, at the time of his appointment, a
criminal trial was pending in which respondent No.3 was not only an
accused but a proclaimed offender and the other that even at the time
of his enrolment as an advocate he had concealed the criminal
proceedings and in the relevant column of the application for
enrolment with the Bar Council, he falsely stated that there was no
pending proceeding against him.
2. In order to put the petitioners’ challenge to the appointment of
respondent No.3 as a judge of the High Court in the proper
perspective, it will be useful to give here a brief outline of the relevant
facts.
3. The name of respondent No.3 was recommended for
appointment as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on
November 14, 1998 by the Chief Justice of the High Court with the
other two Collegium members agreeing with the recommendation.
The recommendation made by the High Court was received in the
Supreme Court on February 15, 1999. At that time the age of
respondent No.3 was 41 years and six months and he had completed
over 15 years of legal practice. In the resume prepared by the
2
Ministry of Law and Justice that came to be put up before the
Supreme Court Collegium, respondent No.3 was described as under:
“Shri N.V. Ramana, Advocate:
BIO-DATA
He was enrolled as an Advocate on February
10, 1983. He has practiced in the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, Central and Andhra Pradesh Administrative
Tribunals and the Supreme Court of India in Civil,
Criminal, Constitutional, Labour, Service and Election
matters. He has specialized in Constitutional, Criminal,
Service and Inter-State River laws. He has handled
about 800 cases during the last three years. He has
functioned as Panel Counsel for Andhra Bank, Vysa
Bank, United India Insurance Co. and Food Corporation
of India. He has also functioned as Additional Standing
Counsel for Central Government and Standing Counsel
for Railways in the Central Administrative Tribunal at
Hyderabad. At present he is functioning as Additional
Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh. His professional
income during the last three years was as tabulated
below:
Year Gross Income Taxable Income
1996-97 7,87,210 2,21,200
1997-98 10,31,465 3,68,950
1998-99 38,95,973 16,94,928”
And the Intelligence Bureau report about him stated as under:
“I.B. REPORT:
He enjoys good personal/professional image.
Nothing adverse against his character, reputation and
integrity has come to notice, so far. He has also not come
3
to notice for links with any political party/communal
organization.
None of his relatives is either serving or has served
earlier as judge in any High Court or Supreme Court.”
4. Following the consultative process between the different
constitutional functionaries, a notification was issued on June 19,
2000 appointing respondent No.3 as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court and respondent No.3 took the oath and assumed the
office as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on June 27,
2000. Since then he is continuously working in that capacity.
5. It now comes to light that all through the period when the
recommendation was made for his appointment as a judge and the
notification was issued and he assumed the office as a judge, a
criminal case was pending in which respondent No.3 was an
accused. It is, therefore, necessary to look into the criminal case and
its proceedings. The criminal case in question dates back to the year
1981 when respondent No.3 was a student of Nagarjuna University.
The students of the University, it appears, complained of inadequate
public transport facilities for commuting from their homes to the
University as only a few buses plying between Guntur and
Vijayawada stopped at the University. They demanded that more
4
buses should stop at the University. As is not uncommon with the
youth in this country, some of the students of the University took to
agitation in connection with the demand and at about 8.30 p.m. on
February 13, 1981, a group of about 30 students put road blocks on
the GNT road, opposite Nagarjuna University, causing stoppage of all
vehicles on the road. At about 9.15 p.m., a bus of the State Transport
Corporation, on its way from Guntur to Vijayawada, arrived there
when there was already a heavy jam and pulled up at the road flank.
In such situations, unfortunately a State bus is the softest and the
most vulnerable target. In this case also the State bus became the
target of the agitating students’ ire. The driver of the bus was pulled
down and the door to the driver’s seat was damaged. Some
miscreants pelted stones on the bus and smashed its windscreen and
glass windows with iron rods. One of the passengers also received
some injuries. By this time a police party also came to the spot. At
this stage, an attempt was made to set fire to the bus by throwing a
burning oil cloth tied to a rod inside the bus. But, a policeman put out
the burning cloth and the bus was saved from any further damage.
Shortly thereafter the police dispersed the agitating students and
restored normalcy. On the same day at 11.00 p.m. the driver of the
5
bus lodged a first information report in connection with the incident at
Mangalagiri Police Station where it was registered as Crime No. 55 of
1981 under Sections 147, 342, 427 and 324 of the Penal Code. The
FIR was against unknown persons and the accused were described
as “Nagarjuna University students”.
6. The police after investigation drew up a charge sheet dated
October 10, 1983 and on October 19, 1983 submitted it in the court of
the Munsif Magistrate, Mangalagiri where it was registered as C.C.
No.229/1983. From the charge sheet it appears that in their
statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the Driver and the Conductor of the bus (apart from some
other witnesses) identified and named five persons as the studentleaders
who were leading the agitation on February 13, 1981. The
charge sheet, accordingly, cited five persons as accused and
respondent No.3 figured among them at serial No. 4. All the accused
were shown as absconders. The charge sheet, however, does not
disclose what steps were taken by the investigating officer to secure
the presence of the accused. There is no mention that the
investigating officer ever tried to obtain from the court warrants of
arrest or processes under Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal
6
Procedure for apprehending the accused. They were simply shown
as absconders without observing the procedure sanctioned by law
before an accused can be called an absconder.
7. The fact of the matter, however, is that this Crime Case
No.229/83 (later re-numbered as CC No.75/87 and then CC
No.167/91) was undeniably pending at the time of appointment of
respondent No.3 as a judge of the High Court and it is contended on
behalf of the petitioners that the failure to take into account the
pendency of the criminal case while his name was recommended by
the High Court Collegium and approval and consent was accorded by
the Supreme Court Colllegium and the Central Government for his
appointment as a judge of the High Court deeply flawed the
participatory consultative process as envisaged in Article 217(1) of
the Constitution and as developed by the decisions of this Court in
Supreme Court Advocates-on–Record Association1 and later on in
Special Reference No. 1 of 19982. It is submitted the appointment of
the respondent resulting from a consultation process that failed to
take into account an important and relevant fact was completely
illegal and was, therefore, liable to be quashed by a writ of quo
1 (1993) 4 SCC 441
2 (1998) 7 SCC 739
7
warranto. The respondent had no right to hold the office of a High
Court judge and this Court must step in to correct the grave error
committed by his appointment.
8. It needs to be noted here that the learned Attorney General was
requested to address the Court on the question of maintainability of
this writ petition that seeks a writ, quashing the appointment of a
judge of the High Court. The Attorney General submitted that the writ
petition was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed
summarily. He submitted that the prayer for a writ of quo warranto
quashing the appointment of respondent No.3 was only a camouflage
and what the petitioners really aimed at was the removal of the judge
who had been in office for over twelve years. The removal of a judge
in office, the Attorney maintained, was an issue directly related to the
independence of judiciary that is fundamental to the Constitutional
scheme. The Attorney pointed out that in order to make the judiciary
independent and to make it possible for the judges to discharge their
duties without fear or favour the Constitution firmly secured the tenure
of a judge and granted that a judge of any of the superior courts could
only be removed from office on the basis of an impeachment motion
passed by the Parliament as provided under Article 124(4) (in the
8
case of a judge of the Supreme Court) and Article 217 read with
Article 124(4) (in the case of a judge of the High Court). The
Constitution did not recognize any other mode for the removal of a
judge. Any deviation from the Constitutional process in the garb of
quashing the appointment by a writ of quo warranto would be
violative of the scheme of the Constitution and deleterious for the
independence of the judiciary. He further submitted that if the
petitioners thought that the appointment of respondent No.3 as a
judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was wrong and there were
grounds for his removal from the office, they could always bring the
matter to the notice of the Parliament which alone was the
Constitutional forum competent to remove a judge of the High Court
from his office from any misbehaviour committed either before or after
his appointment as a judge. He added that in case the Parliament
declined to take any action for the removal of the judge on the
petitioner’s complaint the Court was powerless in the matter and the
removal of the judge could not be brought about by the device of
quashing his appointment. He went so far as to say that in
entertaining this writ petition on merits the Court would be
overstepping its Constitutional limits.
9
9. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior advocate appearing for the
petitioners, on the other hand, submitted that writ petition raised the
issue of inviolability and credibility of appointment to the high office of
the High Court judge. He further submitted that the Court must not be
seen as protecting someone wrongly appointed as a judge of the
High Court for, the people’s faith and trust and confidence in the
courts and the judges presiding over the courts was as much
necessary to support the independence of judiciary as the guarantees
under the Constitution and the laws. Mr. Shanti Bhushan further
submitted that in the past also similar issues came before the Court
and the Court never declined to examine the merits of the case and
passed appropriate orders. In support of the submission, he relied
upon the decisions of this Court in (i) Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v.
Union of India3, (ii) Shanti Bhushan v. Union of India4 and (iii) Mahesh
Chandra Gupta v. Union of India5.
10. The second case cited by Mr. Shanti Bhushan is one which he
himself had filed as public interest litigation, assailing the extension
granted to respondent No.2 in that case as an Additional Judge of the
Madras High Court. He relied upon paragraph 25 of the judgment in
3 (1992) 2 SCC 428
4 (2009) 1 SCC 657
5 (2009) 8 SCC 273
10
that case but, we fail to see anything in that decision that may serve
as an authority on the question of maintainability of a writ petition for
quashing the appointment of a judge after many years of his
assuming the office.
11. However, the first and the third case relied upon by Mr. Shanti
Bhushan deserve consideration.
12. In Shri Kumar Padma Prasad, the Court dealt with a writ
petition that was filed originally before the Gauhati High Court but
was later transferred and brought to this Court. The writ petition was
filed at the stage where though the warrant had been issued under
the hand and seal of the President of India, appointing one of the
respondents in that case, namely, K.N. Srivastava as a judge of the
Gauhati High Court, he was still to make and subscribe the
oath/affirmation under Article 219 of the Constitution. This means that
he had not entered upon the office of the judge and the writ petition
was filed before the matter had reached the stage of Article 217 as
the person whose appointment was under challenge was yet to
assume the office of the judge. In that case this Court indeed stepped
in to interfere and to stop the appointment from materializing. This
Court found and held that on the date of issue of the warrant by the
11
President of India K.N. Srivastava was not qualified to be appointed
as a judge of the High Court. It, accordingly, quashed his
appointment as a judge of the Gauhati High Court and directed the
Union of India and the other concerned respondents not to administer
the oath or affirmation under Article 219 of the Constitution to K.N.
Srivastava. K.N. Srivastava was similarly restrained from making and
subscribing the oath or affirmation in terms of Article 219 of the
Constitution of India. It is, thus, to be noted that the Court intervened
in the matter before the person concerned had assumed the office of
the judge on the ground that he was not qualified to be appointed as
a judge or, in other words, was not eligible to be appointed as a
judge.
13. The concepts of “eligibility” and “suitability” were later examined
by this Court in the decision in Mahesh Chandra Gupta (to which one
of us Aftab Alam, J. was also a Member). In Mahesh Chandra Gupta,
challenge was made to the appointment of a judge of the Allahabad
High Court after the incumbent had assumed his office. In the writ
petition, as it was originally filed, the appointment was questioned
only on the ground that the incumbent did not possess the basic
eligibility for being appointed as a judge of the High Court. Later on,
12
the appointment was also challenged on grounds of suitability and
want of effective consultation process by taking additional pleas in
supplementary affidavits. Kapadia, J. (as His Lordship then was),
speaking for the Court brought out the distinction between “eligibility”
and “suitability” and pointed out that eligibility was based on objective
facts and it was, therefore, liable to judicial review. But, suitability
pertained to the realm of opinion and was, therefore, not amenable to
any judicial review. The Court also examined the class of cases
relating to appointment of High Court judges that might fall under
judicial scrutiny and concluded that judicial review may be called for
on two grounds namely, (i) “lack of eligibility” and (ii) “lack of effective
consultation”. In paragraphs 39, 43 and 44 of the judgment the Court
said:
“39. At this stage, we may state that, there is a
basic difference between “eligibility” and “suitability”. The
process of judging the fitness of a person to be appointed
as a High Court Judge falls in the realm of suitability.
Similarly, the process of consultation falls in the realm of
suitability. On the other hand, eligibility at the threshold
stage comes under Article 217(2)(b). This dichotomy
between suitability and eligibility finds place in Article
217(1) in juxtaposition to Article 217(2). The word
“consultation” finds place in Article 217(1) whereas the
word “qualify” finds place in Article 217(2).
13
43. One more aspect needs to be highlighted.
“Eligibility” is an objective factor. Who could be elevated is
specifically answered by Article 217(2). When
“eligibility” is put in question, it could fall within the
scope of judicial review. However, the question as to
who should be elevated, which essentially involves the
aspect of “suitability”, stands excluded from the purview of
judicial review.
44. At this stage, we may highlight the fact that there is
a vital difference between judicial review and merit
review. Consultation, as stated above, forms part of the
procedure to test the fitness of a person to be appointed a
High Court Judge under Article 217(1). Once there is
consultation, the content of that consultation is beyond
the scope of judicial review, though lack of effective
consultation could fall within the scope of judicial
review. This is the basic ratio of the judgment of the
Constitutional Bench of this Court in Supreme Court
Advocates-on-Record Assn. and Special Reference No. 1
of 1998.
(emphasis added)
14. In paragraphs 71 and 74 of the judgment again the Court
observed as under:
Justiciability of appointments under Article 217(1)
71. In the present case, we are concerned with the
mechanism for giving effect to the constitutional
justification for judicial review. As stated above, “eligibility”
is a matter of fact whereas “suitability” is a matter of
opinion. In cases involving lack of “eligibility” writ of quo
warranto would certainly lie. One reason being that
“eligibility” is not a matter of subjectivity. However,
“suitability” or “fitness” of a person to be appointed a High
14
Court Judge: his character, his integrity, his competence
and the like are matters of opinion.
74. It is important to note that each constitutional
functionary involved in the participatory consultative
process is given the task of discharging a participatory
constitutional function; there is no question of hierarchy
between these constitutional functionaries. Ultimately, the
object of reading such participatory consultative process
into the constitutional scheme is to limit judicial review
restricting it to specified areas by introducing a judicial
process in making of appointment(s) to the higher
judiciary. These are the norms, apart from modalities, laid
down in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. and
also in the judgment in Special Reference No. 1 of 1998,
Re. Consequently, judicial review lies only in two
cases, namely, “lack of eligibility” and “lack of
effective consultation”. It will not lie on the content of
consultation.
(emphasis added)
15. In view of the decision in Mahesh Chandra Gupta, the question
arises whether or not the case in hand falls in any of the two
categories that are open to judicial review. Admittedly, the eligibility of
respondent No.3 is not an issue. Then, can the case be said to raise
the issue of “lack of effective consultation”.
16. Mr. Shanti Bhushan strongly argued that the consultation that
led to the appointment of respondent No.3 as the judge of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court was completely deficient for not taking into
consideration that he was accused in a pending criminal case and as
15
a result, the appointment of respondent No.3 was wholly vitiated and
it was fit to be quashed by this Court. In support of the submission
Mr. Shanti Bhushan heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in
Centre for PIL and another v. Union of India and another6 (commonly
called as the CVC case). Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that in that
case this Court had made institutional integrity as part of eligibility
criteria and had, thus, highly raised the standards of qualification for
appointment to a public office.
17. In the CVC case a three judge Bench of this Court held that the
recommendation for appointment of Shri P.J. Thomas as the Central
Vigilance Commissioner was non-est in law and, consequently,
quashed his appointment to that post. The recommendation for
appointment of Shri P.J. Thomas was made, by a majority of 2:1, by a
committee consisting of (i) the Prime Minister, (ii) the Minister of
Home Affairs and (iii) The Leader of Opposition in the House of the
People (referred to in the judgment as the High-Powered Committee
or the HPC). The Court held that the recommendation was non-est
because the HPC had failed to take into consideration the pendency
of case No. 6 of 2003 (relating to the import of Palmolein oil by the
Kerala Government), in which the Government of Kerala had
6 (2011) 4 SCC 1
16
accorded sanction for the prosecution of Shri P.J. Thomas (among
others) for committing offences punishable under Section 120-B of
the Penal Code read with Sections 13 (i) (d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and had based its recommendation entirely on the
blanket clearance given to Shri P.J. Thomas by the CVC (then in
office) and the fact that during the pendency of the criminal case Shri
P.J. Thomas was appointed as Chief Secretary of Kerala, then as the
Secretary of Parliamentary Affairs and subsequently as the
Secretary, Telecom.
18. At the first glance the CVC case appears to have some
parallels with the case in hand and in order to apply the decision in
the CVC case to the present case Mr. Shanti Bhushan extensively
cited from the judgment the passages where this Court identified the
CVC as an institution and an “integrity institution”, stressed the
imperative to uphold and preserve the integrity of that institution and
observed that the recommendation for appointment as CVC should
be not only with reference to the candidate but the overarching
consideration should be the institutional integrity of the office. (See
paragraphs 34-37, 42, 43, 47, 59 and 89 of the judgment).
17
19. We have given the most careful consideration to the CVC
decision and the submissions made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan on the
basis of that decision, all the time bearing in mind that the Court must
not overlook or condone something that may have the effect of
lowering down the people’s faith or trust in the judges or in courts. But
we find that though there are some superficial similarity between the
CVC case and the case in hand, the two cases are quite different in
their core issues and we find it impossible to justly apply the CVC
decision to the facts of the case in hand.
20. In the CVC case the HPC was not unaware of Shri P.J.
Thomas being an accused in a pending case for offences punishable
under Sections 120-B of the Penal Code read with Section 13(1)(d) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. The recommendation that the HPC
made in exercise of the statutory power under the proviso to Section
4 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 was in a sense in
defiance of the pending trial before the criminal court. The genesis
and the developments taking place in the criminal case are discussed
in paragraph 8 to 21 of the judgment in the CVC case from which it
appears that the institution of the case was preceded by the report of
the Comptroller and Auditor General, followed by the report by the
18
Public Undertaking Committee of the Kerala Assembly. On the basis
of the reports, at least two writ petitions were filed (unsuccessfully)
seeking direction of the High Court for institution of a criminal case.
The criminal case was finally filed after the new government came to
power in the State following the election on May 20, 1996. Even after
the institution of the case the matter had repeatedly gone to the High
Court and traveled up to this Court. The Government of Kerala had
made repeated requests to the Central Government in the
Department of Personnel and Training for grant of sanction for
prosecution of Shri P.J. Thomas. The matter had gone to the Central
Vigilance Commission and there were its recommendations on record
for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Shri P.J. Thomas. In
paragraph 44 of the judgment, the Court pointed out that between
2000 and 2004 there were at least six noting of the DoPT suggesting
that penalty proceedings may be initiated against Shri P.J. Thomas.
21. In short, the fact about the pendency of the criminal case and
Shri P.J. Thomas being one of the accused in the case was writ large
all over the record before the HPC. The fact was not only within the
personal knowledge of each of the three members of the HPC but it
was in public domain. Hence, the recommendation of the HPC was
19
not in ignorance of the criminal case. The recommendation was for
appointment of Shri P.J. Thomas as the Central Vigilance
Commissioner notwithstanding his being an accused in the criminal
case and the HPC appeared not to see the criminal case as any
impediment in the way of his appointment as the Chief Vigilance
Commissioner.
22. Let us now examine how far the facts of the present case bear
similarity to the CVC case.
23. In the writ petition and in course of hearing of the case
respondent No.3 has been repeatedly called, a little loosely and
rather uncharitably, an “absconder” and a “proclaimed offender” in a
case of robbery and burning down of a bus. It is seen above that the
criminal case in question had no element of robbery or bus burning.
We may now examine how far it is correct to call respondent No.3 as
an “absconder” and a “proclaimed offender”.
24. It is noted above that the charge sheet was filed in the court of
the Munsif Magistrate, Mangalagiri on October 19, 1983. On October
25, the Magistrate directed for issuance of summonses, fixing
November 25, 1983 as the date for hearing. The summonses, issued
in pursuance of the order, are on file marked as paper nos. 25 to 30,
20
but they bear no endorsement about service. At the reverse of
summonses to accused 3 and 4, it is mentioned that they were
studying in B.L., First Year, Nagarjuna University. On November 25,
1983, the accused were not present in court. Their absence was
recorded in the order-sheet and fresh summonses were directed to
be issued, fixing December 23, 1983 as the date of hearing. Whether
or not summonses were issued in pursuance of the order is not
known because those summonses are not on the record. On
December 23, 1983, the accused were again not present and
summonses were again directed to be issued, fixing January 25,
1984 for hearing. On January 25, 1984, the accused were once
again not present and fresh summonses were issued fixing February
15, 1984 for hearing. The summonses are on the file marked as
paper Nos. 31 to 36. The case was then listed on a number of dates
but the accused did not appear. Finally on November 27, 1985,
accused 1 appeared in court but accused 2 to 5 were still not present.
On January 9, 1987, the court ordered to separate the case of
accused 2 to 5 and proceeded with the trial of accused 1. On June 2,
1987, statement of accused 1 was recorded under Section 251 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. On March 1, 1988, the statements of
21
PW1 and PW2, namely, S. Satyanarayanaraju and P. Peda Sivaiah
(being the driver and conductor of the bus in question) were
recorded. It is significant to note that neither the driver nor the
conductor of the bus (PW1 and PW2 respectively), named or
identified the accused who had attacked the bus. The driver said that
around 50 or 60 students had charged at them in a group. The
conductor said that when the driver stopped the bus, the students
came shouting and blocked the bus. He became afraid and ran away
with the cash bag. The prosecution did not examine any more
witnesses and on May 12, 1988, accused 1 was examined under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Finally by judgment
and order dated July 4, 1988, the trial court found accused 1 not
guilty of the offences alleged against him and acquitted him of the
charges. While acquitting him, the trial judge noted that the
prosecution witnesses were not able to identify the accused. It was
also noted that as per the FIR the incident occurred at night and the
bus was attacked by more than 50 persons and there was no material
with regard to the identity of the culprits who attacked the bus and
caused damage. It was noted that the FIR does not mention the
names of the persons who participated in the offence. It was also
22
noted that in his deposition before the trial court PW2 (the bus
conductor) denied having identified the accused in his statement
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
25. Let us now see the case relating to the other four accused,
including accused 4, that is respondent No.3.
26. It is noted above that on November 27, 1985 accused 1 alone
appeared before the court. On March 5, 1986 the court ordered for
issuance of non-bailable warrants against accused 2 to accused 5.
The warrants are not on record and it is not known whether any
warrants were in fact issued in pursuance of the order. On January 9,
1987 the court ordered to separate the case of accused 2 to accused
5. After the case was separated, the record pertaining to accused 2 to
accused 5 was registered as CC No. 75/87 and was later
renumbered as CC No. 167/91. From the order sheet it appears that
from May 1987 to August 1991, the court passed orders on about
twenty four dates directing for issuance of non-bailable warrants of
arrest against the accused but no compliance is noted against any
order, excepting the one passed on August 30, 1991. However, no
warrants, even of that date, are on the file. Mechanical orders
continued to be passed in the same fashion till April 2000 and then
23
suddenly on May 8, 2000 the order was passed for issuance of nonbailable
warrants and processes under Sections 82 & 83 of Code of
Criminal Procedure against the accused, fixing July 18, 2000 as the
next date in the case. The compliance of the order is noted on May
11, 2000 on the order sheet. From the record it, however, appears
that process under Sections 82 & 83 was issued on May 11, 2000
only against accused 3, P.R. Muruthy son of P.B. Subbarao.
Thereafter, the case was listed on several dates, awaiting execution
of warrants and proclamation. On June 20, 2001 the court took steps
for recording evidence in absence of the accused under Section 299
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and then, after the case was listed
on three different dates, on November 5, 2011, the examination-inchief
of the bus driver (PW1) was recorded under Section 299 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. On the same date, the examination-inchief
of the bus conductor (PW2) was recorded. In their depositions
neither PW1 nor PW2 (the bus driver and the bus conductor) named
anyone as accused and both of them said that they did not know the
leaders of the group of students that had attacked the bus. Again on
the same day, that is November 5, 2011, the Assistant Public
Prosecutor made an application to the effect that the other witnesses
24
mentioned in the charge-sheet were passengers in the bus and their
whereabouts are not known in view of the passage of time.
Accordingly, it was prayed that the evidence of the prosecution may
be closed.
27. Thereafter, the Magistrate submitted the record to the Sessions
Judge, Guntur with the request to issue proceedings to treat the case
as long pending case. The Sessions Judge on December 26, 2011
gave permission to the trial judge to declare the case being CC No.
167/1991 as a long pending case.
28. However, soon thereafter on January 31, 2002, the Assistant
Public Prosecutor moved an application under Section 321 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking permission to withdraw the case
in the interest of justice. A reference was made in the application to
GO Rt No. 1961, dated December 11, 2001 whereby the Government
had decided to withdraw the prosecution against the accused
persons. On a consideration of the materials on record, by an order
dated January 31, 2002, the trial judge granted permission to the
prosecution to withdraw the case and, accordingly, all the accused
were discharged.
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29. A perusal of the court record shows that during the entire
period, service of summonses in the ordinary course were not
effected on the four accused persons. Although a proclamation under
Section 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was ordered to
be issued, the record does not show any publication having been
made. However, the record does show that service was sought to be
effected by beat of drum only on accused 3. There is nothing on the
record to show that any attempt, let alone any serious attempt, was
made to serve the summons or the non-bailable warrants on any of
the accused persons.
30. The purpose in adverting to the proceedings of the criminal
case in detail is not to point out the irregularities in the proceeding.
Anyone even with a passing acquaintance with the Code of Criminal
Procedure can see that gross irregularities were committed practically
at every step in the proceeding. We have referred to the proceedings
to judge whether respondent No. 3 could be said to have any
knowledge of the case in which he was cited as accused 4. From the
record of the case which we have discussed in detail above, we find it
very difficult to hold that respondent No. 3 was even aware that in
some record buried in the courts at Mangalagiri he was named as an
26
accused and he was required to appear in the court in connection
with that case.
31. Apart from the record of the case, there are external
circumstances that strengthen this view. From the resume of
respondent No. 3, as noted at the beginning of the judgment, it may
be seen that before his appointment as a judge of the High Court, he
was the Additional Advocate General of Andhra Pradesh. If the case
would have been within his knowledge it is unimaginable that he
would not have attended to it and got it concluded one way or the
other.
32. Here it may also be noted that before filing this writ petition
before this Court the petitioners had made a representation, both
before the Chief Justice of India and the Law Minister, asking for the
removal of respondent No. 3 as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court on the same allegations. The representation that came to the
office of the Chief Justice of India received full consideration and the
Chief Justice of India called for a report on the matter from the Chief
Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court vide his letter dated
January 18, 2012. The Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh High Court
made a detailed enquiry and submitted his report dated February 7,
27
2012. In his report the Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh High Court
came to the same conclusion as we have arrived at on an
independent appraisal of the record of the case. In paragraphs 29
and 32 of the report, the Chief Justice stated as under:
“29. It does appear that Justice XXX was unaware of the
pendency of the criminal case. I say this from the record
of the case, which speaks for itself, and the contents of
which need not be repeated. I also say this for another
reason.
32. In my opinion Justice XXX was truly unaware of the
criminal case against him and he deserves to be believed
when he says so.”
33. In light of the discussion made above, we have no hesitation in
holding that at the time respondent No.3 was being considered for
appointment as a judge of the High Court, he was unaware of any
case being pending in which he was named as an accused and it is
quite wrong to refer to him as “an absconder and a proclaimed
offender” in the case. This finding leads to another and that is, it is not
a case of suppression of any material fact by respondent No.3 or at
his behest. Here we wish to make it clear that had it been a case of
deliberate and conscious suppression of material fact by respondent
No.3 the position would have been entirely different. But that is not
the case here.
28
34. Now we propose to examine whether apart from respondent
No. 3, anyone else, who could be in the position to bring the fact to
the knowledge of the High Court Collegium or the State Government
or the Supreme Court Collegium or the Central Government, was
aware of the pendency of the case.
35. Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that the State Police had
submitted the charge-sheet against respondent No. 3 and hence, the
State Government must be deemed to be aware of the fact. The
submission plainly overlooks that the State Government is not a
monolith and it does not function as a single person. The State
Government functions in different departments manned by different
people and simply because a charge-sheet was submitted by the
State Police no conscious knowledge of the fact can be attributed to
the State Government.
36. We have carefully gone through the record relating to the
appointment of respondent No. 3 as a judge of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court. From the record it is evident that none of the members of
the High Court or the Supreme Court Collegia was aware of the fact.
The State Government was equally unaware of the fact and so was
29
the Central Government as is evident from the resume prepared by
the Law Ministry as also the IB Report.
37. This is not all. In 1993, respondent No. 3 was a candidate for
the post of the Member of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and in
that connection he was interviewed by a Selection Committee headed
by a sitting judge of the Supreme Court. He was selected for
appointment and was issued an appointment letter dated September
8, 1995 as judicial member in the ITAT. The appointment letter was
undoubtedly issued to him only after police verification and nothing
was mentioned even at that stage about any criminal case pending
against him. He did not accept the appointment is another matter
altogether.
38. From all the attending circumstances, it is clear beyond doubt
that not only respondent No. 3 himself but practically no one was
aware of the pendency of the case in which he was named as an
accused.
39. The question, therefore, arises can a fact that is unknown to
anyone be said to be not taken into consideration and can the
consultative process faulted as incomplete for that reason. To our
mind, the answer can only be in the negative. To fault the
30
consultative process for not taking into account a fact that was not
known at that time would put an impossible burden on the
Constitutional Authorities engaged in the consultative process and
would introduce a dangerous element of uncertainty in the
appointments.
40. In case it comes to light that some material facts were withheld
by the person under consideration or suppressed at his behest then
that may be a case of fraud that would vitiate the consultative process
and consequently the appointment resulting from it. But in case there
was no suppression and the fact comes to light a long time after the
person appointed has assumed the office of a judge and if the
Members of the two Houses of the Parliament consider the
discovered fact sufficiently serious to constitute misbehaviour and to
warrant his removal, then he may still be removed from office by
taking recourse to the provisions of Article 124(4) or Article 217 read
with Article 124(4) as the case may be. In case, however, the fact
was unknown and there was no suppression of that fact, a writ of quo
warranto would certainly not lie on the plea that the consultative
process was faulty.
31
41. In light of the discussion made above, we are clearly of the view
that no case is made out for issuing a writ of quo warranto quashing
the appointment of respondent No. 3 as the judge of Andhra Pradesh
High Court.
42. The legal issue raised by Mr. Shanti Bhushan is answered but
this matter cannot be given a proper closure unless we also say that
this writ petition professed to have been filed in public interest is, in
our view, but a ruse to malign respondent No.3.
43. In his report to the Chief Justice of India the Chief Justice,
Andhra Pradesh High Court has made the following comment:
“27. The incident occurred almost 30 years ago. The case
against Justice Ramana was withdrawn almost 10 years
ago. That it should be raked up now is a little inexplicable.
The case does not seem to have been sensational in any
manner whatsoever so that someone would be following it
up. Therefore, it is a little odd that it should have suddenly
surfaced now. It is possible that there is some reason
behind digging up this case, but I am unable to fathom the
motive.”
44. What the Chief Justice said, in a highly restrained manner,
about the representation addressed to the Chief Justice of India,
applies more to this writ petition. The writ petition owes its origin to a
news report published in a Telugu daily newspaper called ‘Sakshi’ on
December 27, 2011. A translated copy of the report is enclosed as
32
Annexure P-11 to the writ petition. The report is based on incorrect
facts and is full of statements and innuendos that might easily
constitute the offence of defamation leave alone contempt of court.
After the news broke out, the petitioners seem to have collected the
record of the criminal case and filed this writ petition on that basis.
The writ petition is drafted with some skill and it presents the facts of
the criminal case in a rather twisted way in an attempt to portray
respondent No.3 in bad light. The way the writ petition is drafted
shows that the petitioners are competent and experienced counsel.
Had they examined the records of the criminal case objectively and
honestly, there was no reason for them not to come to the same
conclusion as arrived at in this judgment or as appearing from the
report of the Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh High Court. It, therefore,
appears to us that this writ petition is not a sincere and honest
endeavour to correct something which the petitioners truly perceive to
be wrong but the real intent of this petition is to malign respondent
No.3.
45. It is indeed very important to uphold the “institutional integrity”
of the court system as pointed out in the CVC judgment and as
strongly advocated by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, but it is equally important
33
to protect the court from uncalled for attacks and the individual judges
from unjust infliction of injuries.
46. In light of the discussions made above, we find this writ petition
not only without merit but also wanting in bona fides. It is,
accordingly, dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- payable by each of
the two petitioners. The cost amount must be deposited in a fund for
the welfare of the employees of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
within four weeks from today.
…..…………………………J.
(Aftab Alam)
…..…………………………J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi;
February 4, 2013.
34
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.4 SECTION PIL
(For Judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 174 OF 2012
M. MANOHAR REDDY & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date: 04/02/2013 This Petition was called on for
pronouncement of judgment today.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayan, Adv.
Mr.Senthil Jagadeesan,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, AG (AC)
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aftab Alam pronounced the
judgment of the Bench comprising of His Lordship
and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai.
The writ petition is dismissed with costs of
Rs.50,000/- payable by each of the two
petitioners. The cost amount must be deposited in
a fund for the welfare of the employees of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court within four weeks from
today.
(Neetu Khajuria)
Sr.P.A.
(Sneh Bala Mehra)
Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.)
35